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1. Mission
This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies
is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a
competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been
established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation
related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided
with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found
that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational
manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product
Responsibility will get promoted.
2. Background and the importance
Competitive strategies for firms and environmental regulations for governments jointly play
an important role in dictating the success of implementing Extended Product Responsibility
(EPR) policies (Chen & Sheu, 2009; Reijnders, 2003). At the same time, strategic management
has long been considered a significant part of business competitiveness. Most of existing
reports, however, concentrate only on the impact of policies per se, rather than than on the
existence of market interaction. This paper, therefore, shed new light on recycling policy
designs under a more realistic market condition by the help a differential game model.
Existing analysis of recycling policy – including Design for Environment (DfE) incentives – are
mostly based on a single company model (Chen & Sheu, 2009; Choe & Fraser, 2001; Fullerton
& Wu, 1998; Stavins, 2002). From the literature, however, we understand that consequence of
incentive behave differently in a multiple companies competition context (Chen & Sheu, 2009;
Dockner et al., 2000), and thus the interactive effect of incentive policies and regulations needs
to be reviewed. Moreover, product pricing and manufacturing costs mostly determine the
profitability of a firm. Manufacturers accrue their profits by setting the right pricing strategies
with consideration for competitor responses and product characteristics (Reijnders, 2003).
Among the environmental policy literature, however, while tax or subsidy pricing is often
discussed, little attention is given to product pricing and environmental friendly designpolicy.
In recent years, EPR has attracted much attention and the notion of EPR has been part of the
concept of green supply chain. According to (Barde & Stephen, 1997), EPR is defined as a
strategy designed to promote the integration of environmental costs of products throughout
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their life cycles into the market distribution mechanism so as to reduce product harm to the
environment. A prosperous green supply chain can not be substantiated without the help of
proper incentives and public policies (Sheu, 2008). With the implementation of EPR policies
in various supply chains, producer responsibilities have been extended from selling products
to recycling them, meanwhile pushing waste management issues to upstream manufacturers
and even the entire supply chain.
In order to promote the concept of EPR, governments around the globe usually provide
financial incentives for manufacturers and encourage them to engage in EPR practices
(Palmer & Walls, 1999). Appropriate incentive mechanisms not only internalize externality
by changing the cost structure for producers, but they also drive manufacturers to develop
more environmentally friendly products. Moreover, although international prominence has
shifted to product sustainability, the subject of product design is still seen as one of the top
priorities for governments and manufacturers (Chen et al., 2010). When enterprises respond to
strict controls regarding their social responsibility, and at the same time begin to take account
of competitive pricing and manufacturing costs, it is often considered difficult for them
to determine a long-term profit strategy. Existing literature has pointed out that, however,
environmentally friendly designs can reduce material use, enhance business competitiveness,
and have other benefits, there is no clear suggestions or practical consideration given as to
how and to what extent product design can be improved (Chen et al., 2010).
Effect of EPR incentive on green product design reacts differently from a market with
competitors. Member firms in a green supply chain, in every dynamic stage of the decision
making process, attempt to estimate the actions of their rivals and then identify what
corresponding strategies can be used to drive the firm toward a maximized profit situation.
Such strategies, however, are expected to coincide with environmentally friendly design
from the views of policy makers. To facilitate this process, we use a differential game
model to derive optimal design trajectories and to illustrate how manufacturers can adopt
optimal product green design and pricing strategies for pursuing maximal profit whilst also
complying with social responsibility.
3. Literature review and environmental policies
Growing consensus exists that key members of supply and reverse supply chains should
be managed in such a manner that their profits are maximized. Policy instrument issues
have been investigated extensively in the environmental economics field (Benchekroun &
Van Long, 2002; Ulph, 1996; Walls & Palmer, 2001). Along with the growing interest in GSCM
by incorporating reverse logistics functionality into an original SCM strategic framework,
a comprehensive closed-loop supply chain structure that can address diverse issues is
emerging, such as remanufacturing (Mukhopadhyay & Setaputra, 2007; Spicer & Johnson,
2004), product recovery and return (Padmanabhan & Png, 1997), and production-induced
waste reprocessing (Tsoulfas et al., 2002).
Moreover, the notion of Design for Environment (DfE) has been suggested (Spicer & Johnson,
2004; Walls, 2003). The DfE possesses broad coverage (Calcott & Walls, 2005) and strives to
integrate, in a systematic way, various aspects of environment, health, and safety into the
design phase of the production process, while at the same time seeking to satisfy simple and
easy disassembling design criteria (Calcott & Walls, 2005; Walls, 2003). Given such broad
sentiment, this paper focuses particularly on the recyclability of product green design in
the following three areas: ease of disassembly, usage of toxic materials, and reusability of
resources (Calcott & Walls, 2005), i.e., design for recycling (Kriwet et al., 1995).
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The definition of recycling rate has seen a dispute among literature and across country
boarders. Implementation of the recycling vary in countries and therefor the definition
remains different. In WEEE Act, the recycling rate amounts to the recycled weight percentage
with respect to total disposal. It clearly regulates that: (1) the re-use and recycling rate be
up to 75%, and (2) the resource recovery rate be up to 80% of the weight of each recovery
(Yamaguchi, 2002). A prevalent definition of recyclability has been known as a rate or
percentage of recyclable material in a product composition (Duchin & Lange, 1994). This
definition of recyclability is easy in self-checking for individual producer and has been
adopted in this paper.
There are various regulatory and financial incentive schemes. Globalized organizations –
including Apple, Sony, and Matsushita – invest a large portion of their budgets in DfE
activities in order to green their supply chain. The motivation that drives these firms to
implement DfE (Walls, 2003) appears to lie in a combination of regulation and production
cost (Avila, 2006; Chen et al., 2009; Gottberg et al., 2006; Iliyana, 2006; Palmer & Walls, 1999).
In order to compensate for harm caused by the lack of flexibility in command and control,
incentive mechanisms can be a complement to maintaining industry growth (Chen et al., 2009;
Jaffe et al., 1995). Under these mechanisms, manufacturers are charged differently according
to their product’s characteristics in ease of handling (Dinan Terry, 1993; Dobbs, 1991; Fullerton
& Wu, 1998).
Issues associated with exploiting economic incentives to promote all stages of material
recycling have been extensively investigated in the environmental economics field
(Benchekroun&Van Long, 2002; Ulph, 1996;Walls & Palmer, 2001). Although efforts to collect,
recycle, and smelt large amounts of scrap have been exerted, some materials are left behind,
generating an unbalanced closed-loop supply chain.
The price discrimination is expected to regulate manufacturers’ environmental responsibility
effectively. Among existing incentive designs, product charges or taxes are levied against
products that causes environmental pollution prior to production to reflect the externality
costs (Barde & Stephen, 1997). We assume that different incentives for firms largely result
from differentiated processing fees charged by recycling treatment agencies providing
discriminated product recyclability (Duchin & Lange, 1994). In other words, the fee schemes
depend on the total amount of scraps as well as the ease of handling in waste treatment and
processing.
Comparing to previous literature, we provide a distinctive feature. We extendmixed incentive
strategies to a broader view. This paper finds that, for manufacturers in competition,
simultaneously offering financial incentives and increasingly stringent regulation is necessary
for promoting green product recyclability.
4. Competitive differential game model
In attempting to address the effectiveness of EPR instruments in a competitive environment,
our model is built on top of a simplified situation in which an integrated financial incentive
and regulation standard is imposed. To manifest the dynamic interaction, and for ease of
illustration and analysis, we have constructed a differential game model with sales and
recycling dynamics. In our model we assume that, for firms to be environmentally conscious,
certain regulation standards need to be imposed to reflect current social responsibility (Foulon
et al., 2002). Moreover, a certain amount of capital expenditure also needs to be invested in
order to comply with government standards (Cohen, 1999; Foulon et al., 2002).
xi(t) and ξi(t) represent the market share and recycling rate of producer i at time t,
respectively. The incentive is incorporated in recycling treatment fee ui(t), which is charged
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by the treatment agency and depends on the product’s recyclability involvement di(t), e.g.,
the extent of ease of disassembly. To implement a simplified financial incentive in our model,
a treatment agency directly charges manufacturers processing fees without involving other
third party agencies. In the close-to-real situation, there are other agencies as intermediaries,
for example, a Producer Responsibility Organization (PRO) charges EEE manufacturers an
amount of fees and establishes a fund to operate the system perpetually. These intermediate
third part agencies can be incorporated in the future researches.
To study the competitive behavior, i.e., time trajectories, of firms in a market, we denote the
opponents’ price decisions and market share as
p−i(t) = (p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pi−1(t), pi+1(t), . . . , pn(t)),
x−i(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xi−1(t), xi+1(t), . . . , xn(t)).
We normalize the market share xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] such that they sum up to unity at any time
instance
n
∑
i=1
xi(t) = 1.
The sales dynamics can be suitably described by a set of differential equations (1) with the
form of Vidale-Wolfe (Prasad & Sethi, 2004).
x˙i(t) = fxi(xi(t), x
−i(t), p(t))
= ∑
j =i
ρj pj(t)
√
xi(t)−∑
j =i
ρi pi(t)
√
xj(t)− δ(xi(t)− ∑
j =i
xi(t)) (1)
All firms determine their product prices at very time instance in order to conquer maximal
market shares. Pricing decisions are made by responding competitor reactions of prior price
and market share changes. Prices differences between products affect customer purchasing
preferences, thereby causing sales and market share deviation. Market share change rate x˙i of
firm i in (1) constitutes the influence from its own market share xi and the market share xj of
other products.
If manufacturers enhance their green product recyclability design, i.e., the percentage
of weight in their products been recycled, their product recycling rate will increase
proportionately (Choe & Fraser, 2001). However, when reviewing EPR policy literature, we
found that the definition of the recycling rate between countries is not limited to a specific
context.
To relate to the EPR, the responsibility elasticity to unfulfilled recycles (Jalal & Rogers, 2002)
is defined as
α =
∂M
M
∂τ
τ
(2)
where M = 1− ∑ni=1 ξi represents unfulfilled recyclables, ignored by all manufacturers, and
τ represents producer responsibility in a country. For example, α = −2 means unfulfilled
waste will decrease 2% as responsibility increases 1%. Every country may develop different
social responsibility levels. This simply reflects the average environmental consciousness and
regulation stringency in a particular society.
Let ξi(t) and di(t) represent the recycling rate of product i and the recyclability involvement
of product i, respectively. Motivated by diffusion models in marketing and the consequence
of new product sales (Dockner & Fruchter, 2004), the recycling dynamics can be suitably
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described through (3)
ξ˙i(t) = (η + ε idi(t)/τ)
√
xi(t)(1−
n
∑
i=1
ξi(t)) (3)
The influence of the dynamics of the recycling rate constitutes recyclability, the producer
responsibility acting on market share and any unfulfilled recycling weight. The resulting
behavior follows an S-shape dynamics. At lower rates of recycling, the improvement appears
to be slow. When the recycling rate, however, increases to some extent, it starts to rise
dramatically. Eventually, as most of the materials are recyclable, it becomes more difficult to
improve the recycling rate.
The above two dynamics collectively describe the behavior of a recycling system in a
competitive environment. The sales dynamic points out that when manufacturers commence
a price war in the market, sales volume rises in consequence. More sales, however, leads to
more waste, so that manufacturers need to take heavier responsibility for recycling (Barde &
Stephen, 1997). In this case, manufacturers may be more willing to engage in product design
recyclability in order to alleviate increasing costs.
In order to provide the conceptualization terse and to simplify consequent derivations, we
aggregate all ξi(t) to an single τ(t) (Dockner & Fruchter, 2004). By summing up all ξ˙i of (3),
the recycling dynamics can be easily transformed to
ατ˙(t) = −ητ(t)−
n
∑
i=1
ε idi(t)
√
xi(t) (4)
In order to pursue profit maximization, we assume revenue to be solely generated by selling
products, while costs are accrued from multiple sources – such as, production cost wi(xi(·)),
production process upgrading cost hi(di(·)), recycling fee ui(di(·)) paid to the treatment
agency, and capital expenditure n(τ(·); ζ(·))made to comply with the government regulation
standard −ζ(·) (Jaffe et al., 1995). Upgrading costs includes R&D investment, costs incurred
for altering production processes, and costs associated with consuming recyclable materials
(Mukhopadhyay & Setaputra, 2007).
In this paper we assume n is linear in ζτ, which represents the environmental regulation
standard determined by producer responsibility in a society. The net profit amounts to the
difference between sales revenue and all accrued costs and can be written as (5) with the
notion of NPV, where ri is the discount rate and assumed to be constant.
Ji(pi(·), di(·)) =
∫ T
0
e−rtF(xi(t), τ(t), pi(t), di(t), t)dt (5)
where
F(xi(t), τ(t), pi(t), di(t), t) = νi(xi(t), pi(t))− ci(xi(t), τ(t), di(t))
= νi(xi(t), pi(t))− wi(xi(t))− hi(di(t))− ui(xi(t), di(t))− ni(τ(t); ζ(t))
To keep the problem explicit, some assumptions are imposed regarding to the behavior of
manufacturers:
1. We are dealingwith a differential gamewith simultaneous decisionmaking (Dockner et al.,
2000). Every player is rational and seeks to maximize their objective functional.
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2. All products are homogeneous but companies are not. Each firm has its own cost structure
and ability to attract customers from its competitors.
3. There is only one representative treatment agency and it makes no profit in our system.
It offers incentives by charging manufacturers differently according to the level of
recyclability.
With the implementation of incentives and regulations, manufacturers constantly ponder how
to re-allocate costs more effectively and select suitable recyclability involvement in order to
achieve their own profit maximization. With the optimization problem of competing parties,
our differential game model solves the Markovian Nash equilibrium. This occurs when a
participant in a game speculates the optimal strategy of other participants to find his own
optimal strategy. This strategy gives no motivation for all rational participants to deviate from
this equilibrium (Dockner et al., 2000).
Let φi(xi, τ, t) denote a Markovian strategy of producer i. A Markovian Nash equilibrium
satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations (6).
riVi = max
pi ,di
{νi(xi , pi)− ci(xi , τ, di)+
Vix x˙(xi, x
−1, pi) + Viτ τ˙(xi , τ, di)}, i = 1, 2, (6)
where the notation Vix presents the partial derivative of Vi with respect to x, i.e., ∂Vi/∂x.
Expand the HJB (6) to (7)
riVi = max{νi(xi , pi)− hi(di)− ui(xi , di)− ni(τ; ζ)+
Vix(ρ2p2
√
x − ρ1p1
√
1− x − δ(2x − 1))+
Viτ
1
α
(−ητ− ε1d1
√
x − ε2d2
√
1− x)}, i = 1, 2. (7)
Taking maximization with respect to pi and di on the right-hand side of (7) yields
∂νi
∂pi
−Vixρi
√
1− xi = 0 (8)
− ∂hi
∂di
− ∂ui
∂di
−Viτ ε iα
√
xi = 0 (9)
The resulting Markovian Nash equilibriums of (8) and (9) represent the optimal pricing and
design strategies for each firms. We further assume that the revenue function νi(xi(·), pi(·)) is
linear in xi(·) and quadratic in pi(·) and the upgrading cost of recyclability design hi(di(·)) is
quadratic in di(·) and the processing fee ui(xi(·), di(·)) is linear in (1− di(·))
√
xi(·), and then
we have ∂hi∂di = Chi di and
∂ui
∂di
= Cui
√
xi.
The Markovian Nash equilibriums follow:
p∗i =
ρi
Kνi
Vix
√
1− xi (10)
d∗i =
ε iViτ
α + Cui
Chi
√
xi ≡ Fi
√
xi (11)
The HJB condition provides a necessary condition for evaluating the Markovian Nash
equilibrium trajectories. In order to explore the sufficient condition in the future research,
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further restrictions with special structure in the cost function are urged to be imposed (cf.
Dockner et al. (2000)).
The equilibriums are subgame perfect if they are autonomous (Dockner et al., 2000). From the
derivation in the appendix, our solution trajectories are autonomous, that is,
p∗i (t) = φ
i
pi(xi(t), τ(t), t) = φ
i
pi (xi(t), τ(t)), (12)
d∗i (t) = φ
i
di
(xi(t), τ(t), t) = φ
i
di
(xi(t), τ(t)). (13)
Applying the Markovian Nash equilibrium (10) and (11) into the HJB equations (6), we are
then able to solve the Markovian Nash equilibriums with the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations
(14).
riVi ={νi(xi, φipi (xi, τ))− ci(xi, τ, φidi (xi, τ))
+ Vix x˙i(xi, x
−1, φipi (xi, τ)) + Viτ τ˙(xi , τ, φ
i
di
(xi , τ))},
i = 1, 2. (14)
In a competitive environment, gaining product recyclability is deliberate. A firm often
expands its market share by offering prudent price promotion in order not to cause their rivals
to fight-back. The small increase in sales gradually costs the manufacture extra fees to process
the waste. This excess cost, however, tends to eliminate the benefit of price promotion and give
rise to a more conservative promotion strategy. In other words, a producer can choose to sell
less in exchange for lower processing fees without engaging in any product design changes,
even though an intensive incentive program has been realized in a market.
According to the aforementioned assumption, and for the purpose of illustration, we explicitly
set the parameter functions as
ν1(x, p1) = Cν1x +
1
2
Kν1 p
2
1, (15)
ν2(x, p1) = Cν2 (1− x) +
1
2
Kν2 p
2
2, (16)
h1(d1) =
1
2
Ch1d
2
1, (17)
h2(d2) =
1
2
Ch2d
2
2, (18)
u1(x, d1) = Cu1 (1− d1)
√
x, (19)
u2(x, d2) = Cu2 (1− d2)
√
1− x, (20)
n(τ; ζ) = Enζτ. (21)
where production costs w1 and w2 have been merged into the expression of Cν1 and Cν2 ,
respectively. Our main problem therefore can be rewritten explicitly as
max
p1,d1
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Cν1x +
1
2
Kν1 p
2
1 −
1
2
Ch1d
2
1 − Cu1 (1− d1)
√
x − Enζτ
]
dt (22)
max
p2,d2
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Cν2(1− x) +
1
2
Kν2 p
2
2 −
1
2
Ch2d
2
2 − Cu2 (1− d2)
√
1− x− Enζτ
]
dt
Subject to
267Differential Game for Environmental-Regulation in Green Supply Chain
www.intechopen.com
ρi ǫi δ α η r Cνi Kνi Chi Cui ζ x0 τ0
0.3 -2 -0.8 0.08 -10 0.8 0.8
f irm1 0.3 1.1 10 0.1 36 18
f irm2 0.3 1.1 10 0.1 36 18
Table 1. Experiment 1: Parameter settings for comparison scenarios.
x˙ = ρ2p2
√
x − ρ1p1
√
1− x − δ(2x − 1) (23)
ατ˙ = −ητ(t)− ε1d1
√
x− ε2d2
√
1− x (24)
x(0) = x0 (25)
τ(0) = τ0 (26)
(27)
Proposition 1. For the competition described by (15)–(24), the optimal recyclability in the Markovian
Nash equilibrium is a non-decreasing functional of the market share. That is,
∂d∗i (·)
∂xi(·) ≥ 0.
(Please refer to appendix for proof.)
Under the Markovian Nash equilibrium, the market share trajectories are not necessarily
increasing, instead, it follows the sales dynamics controlled by optimal pricing, so that
recyclability cannot be guaranteed to be improved. In the case of a market share trajectory not
increasing, the government cannot drive producers to a state of higher recyclability without
other effective policy. On the other hand, the government can demand all producers take
more product responsibility through making the necessary capital investment – for example,
production process reconstruction for total waste reduction. This additional expenditure can
change the cost structures of manufacturers and force them to reduce costs in other ways,
as there is often no room to raise the sales price in a competitive market. In order to meet
government standards and take advantage of available incentive programs, a certain degree
of product design change needs to be performed – such as easy-disassembly, or increasing the
percentage of recyclable components. Observing the behavior of ourmodel, we conjecture that
if the government forces producers to adopt a higher standard of responsibility in recycling
waste, producers appear to be more environmentally conscious.
Proposition 2. For the competition described by (15)–(24), the optimal recyclability in Markovian
Nash equilibrium is a non-decreasing functional of the regulation stringency (negative of ζ). That is,
∂d∗i (·)
∂ζ(·) ≤ 0.
(Please refer to appendix for proof.)
This paper explains the elaborate interaction between market share, pricing and product
design. We demonstrate our research findings by two experiments – one comparing the
effectiveness of fixed versus increasing policy stringency and the other one showing the
performance with various policy stringency. Our propositions can be illustrated and reviewed
with the related parameter settings in Table 1.
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Stringent
rate vζ
Profit J1 Profit J2 Final
Recyclability
d∗1(T)
Final
Recyclability
d∗2(T)
0.0 933 931 5.96 4.21
0.5 892 896 7.03 4.95
1.0 847 859 8.09 5.69
1.5 798 821 9.16 6.43
2.0 744 780 10.2 7.16
2.5 687 738 11.3 7.90
3.0 626 693 12.3 8.64
3.5 561 647 13.4 9.38
4.0 492 599 14.5 10.1
4.5 419 549 15.5 10.8
Table 2. Experiment: Profit and recyclability increase with stringent rates increased.
Based on the parameter settings, the optimal state trajectories follows
x˙ = −(2ρ1R1
√
T+ 2ρ2R2
√
TX
1+X
+ 2δ)x + 2ρ1R1
√
T
1+X
+ δ,
ατ˙ = −ητ− (ε1F1 − ε2F2)x − ε2F2,
x(0) = x0,
τ(0) = τ0.
In order to manifest the influence of regulation stringency, we conduct an experiment
using the parameter set as previous experiment. The Recycling performance changes can be
observed by changing the rate of stringency. We let the the regulation standard gradually
raised by (28).
ζ = ζ0 + vζ(1− exp(−t)). (28)
The regulation growswith a rate of vζ . As shown in Table 2, all parameters remain unchanged
in the second experiment and ten levels of rate vζ have been employed in this experiment. In
spite of profit decreasing as the regulation becomes more stringent, the recyclability of both
firms increases significantly. Under this policy, manufacturers are therefore endowed with
motivation to enhance their product design.
5. Conclusions
This paper is different from existing works in that it analyzes the interactive effects of
financial drivers and environmental policies through a dynamic approach. This paper
integrates existing differential game models and establishes a novel dynamics analysis that
encourages product recyclability. Taking time and competitors’ reactions into consideration,
the conditions that drivemanufacturers to enhance product recyclability have been identified.
This paper makes a contribution on the EPR effectiveness issue in a competitive market. Based
on the results of this paper, governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards
so that rational manufacturers will implement the corresponding Markovian strategies, i.e.,
gradually improve its product recyclability. On the other hand, more incentive benefits
nevertheless need to be provided where the regulation standard is fixed, in order to urge
businesses to achieve the same level of recyclability as in the case of rising standards.
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This conclusion cannot be reached without considering the interactive behavior among
competitive firms.
Our results further indicate that governments should consider the effectiveness of
environmental policy on the premise that it is nature for business to pursue maximal profits.
In order to develop EPR among industries, the first priority of the government should be to
enact laws or regulations with rising standards to complement available financial incentive
programs. Moreover, to make our differential game model closer to reality, future research
can be conducted with other types of treatment agencies, such as Producer Responsibility
Organization (PRO), private treatment agencies and the issue of illicit disposal of informal
sectors.
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A Theorem Proof
for Proposition 1 in conditions of recyclability. Given the results of (10), apply the function form
(15) to (24), the equations (10) and (11) expand to
p1 =
ρ1
Kν1
V1x
√
1− x (29)
p2 =
ρ2
Kν2
V2x
√
x (30)
d1 =
ε1
α V1τ + Cu1
Ch1
√
x ≡ F1
√
x (31)
d2 =
ε2
α V2τ + Cu2
Ch2
√
1− x ≡ F2
√
1− x (32)
Substitute the Markovian strategies (29) to (32) into (7) and then we have the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation
rV1 =Cν1x−
ρ21
2Kν1
V21x(1− x)−
1
2
Ch1F
2
1x − Cu1F1x − Enζτ
− ρ
2
2
Kν2
V1xV2xx −V1xδ(2x − 1)− ηαV1ττ−
ε1
α
F1V1τx − ε2α F2V1τ(1− x),
rV2 =Cν2(1− x)−
ρ22
2Kν2
V22xx −
1
2
Ch2F
2
2x − Cu2F2x − Enζτ
− ρ
2
1
Kν1
V1xV2x(1− x)−V2xδ(2x − 1)− ηαV2ττ−
ε1
α
F1V2τx − ε2α F2V2τ(1− x),
We conjecture that the value function Vi is linear in the state variables(Prasad & Sethi, 2004).
V1 = A1 +B1x + C1τ, V2 = A2 +B2(1− x) + C2τ.
Therefore V1x = B1, V1τ = C1, V2x = B2 and V2τ = C2. The HJ equations expand to
rA1 + rB1x + rC1τ = −
ρ21
2Kν1
B
2
1 + δB1 −
ε2
α
F2C1
+ (
ρ21
2Kν1
B
2
1 − 2δB1 −
ρ22
Kν2
B1B2 − 12Ch1F
2
1 − (Cu1 +
ε1
α
C1)F1 +
ε2
α
F2C1 + Cν1)x
+ (− η
α
C1 − Enζ)τ,
rA2 + rB2x + rC2τ = −
ρ22
2Kν2
B
2
2 − δB2 −
ε1
α
F1C2
+ (
ρ22
2Kν2
B
2
2 + 2δB2 −
ρ21
Kν1
B1B2 − 12Ch2F
2
2 − (Cu2 +
ε2
α
C2)F2 +
ε1
α
F1C2 + Cν2)(1− x)
+ (− η
α
C2 − Enζ)τ.
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Equating powers of x and τ, some of the unknowns can be easily solved as
A1 =− 1r (
ρ21
2Kν1
B
2
1 − δB1 +
ε2
α
F2C1),
A2 =− 1r (
ρ22
2Kν2
B
2
2 + δB2 +
ε1
α
F1C2),
C1 =C2 = − Enαζαr + η ,
Let
R1 =
ρ21
2Kν1
, R2 =
ρ22
2Kν2
,
W =r + 2δ,
H1 =
ε1ζ
αr + η
,
H2 =
ε2ζ
αr + η
,
Z1 =− 32Ch1
(Cu1 −H1)2 −
1
Ch2
(Cu2 −H2)H2 + Cν1 ,
Z2 =− 32Ch2
(Cu2 −H2)2 −
1
Ch1
(Cu1 −H1)H1 + Cν2 .
To solveB1 andB2,
R1B
2
1 −WB1 − 2R2B1B2 +Z1 = 0,
−R2B22 −WB2 + 2R1B1B2 +Z2 = 0,
or
W(B1 +B2)
2 − (Z1 +Z2)2 = 0,
R1B
2
1 +R2B
2
2 − 2(R1 +R2)B1B2 + (Z1 −Z2) = 0.
Let
B1 = r cos θ,
B2 = r sin θ,
Applying the parameterization approach, the system of nonlinear equations transforms to
r2(1+ sin 2θ) = ((Z1 +Z2)/W)
2, (33)
r2(1+
1
2
R2 −R1
2R1 +R2
(1− cos 2θ)) = (R1 +R2)((Z1 +Z2)/W)2 − (Z1 −Z2). (34)
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Set
S = ((Z1 +Z2)/W)
2,
T = (R1 +R2)((Z1 +Z2)/W)
2 − (Z1 −Z2).
Divide 33 by 34 as
(T
2R2 +R1
2R1 +R2
− S) tan2 θ − 2S tan θ + T− S = 0.
Therefore
tan θ =
S±
√
S
2 − (T 2R2+R1
2R1+R2
− S)(T− S)
T
2R2+R1
2R1+R2
− S
≡ X
and
r = ±
√
T
1+ sin 2 tan−1X
= ±
√
T(1+X2)
(1+X)2
Transform back toB1 andB2,
B1 = ±
√
T
1+X
, B2 = ±
√
TX
1+X
,
The Markov Nash equilibriums follow
p∗1 = ±2R1
√
T
1+X
√
1− x, p∗2 = ±2R2
√
TX
1+X
√
x,
d∗1 =
Enε1ζ
αr+η + Cu1
Ch1
√
x ≡ F1
√
x d∗2 =
Enε2ζ
αr+η + Cu2
Ch2
√
1− x ≡ F2
√
1− x.
Therefore, the derivative of optimal recyclability di with respect to the market share x becomes
∂d∗i
∂x
= Fi ≥ 0

for Proposition 2 with respect to stringency. Follow the results in Proposition 1, the derivative of
optimal recyclability di with respect to ζ becomes
∂d∗i
∂ζ
=
Enε i
αr + η
≤ 0,
since α, η ≤ 0, and r, En, ǫi ≥ 0.

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